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Non-technical summary 
The last couple of years have seen an increasing interest in the evaluation of competition 
policy. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the UK, for instance, recently started to estimate 
the ‘positive impact’ of its activities on direct benefits to consumers and compare these 
numbers to the budget of the competition authority. The Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) 
follows a comparable approach to evaluate its competition policy enforcement and even 
extends the scope of the evaluation by investigating the impact of competition policy on 
macroeconomic factors such as growth and employment.  
 These prominent examples of evaluations of entire competition policies are complemented 
by studies which concentrate on the evaluation and improvement of particular internal 
processes of competition authorities. Examples for this category are a study on the 
effectiveness of merger remedies by the European Commission (2005) or a similar study 
recently published by the UK Competition Commission (2008).  
 Given the different types and scopes of recent studies in the area of evaluation of 
competition policy, it can create value to take a step backward and to raise the question of an 
appropriate general design or set-up of an evaluation of competition policy. This paper aims at 
providing an answer to this question. Based on the existing literature and experiences with 
policy evaluations in other areas of economic activity, the three-step / nine-building-blocks 
methodology provides guidance for evaluation projects and also assists in the identification of 
avenues for further academic research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
In den letzten Jahren sind in verschiedenen Ländern verstärkte Bemühungen beobachtbar, 
wettbewerbspolitische Aktivitäten einer Evaluation zu unterziehen. So nimmt beispielsweise 
das Office of Fair Trading in Großbritannien seit einigen Jahren eine Quantifizierung des 
Nutzens seiner Aktivitäten für die Verbraucher vor und stellt diesen dem bereitgestellten 
Budget gegenüber. Die niederländische Wettbewerbsbehörde (NMa) ist vor kurzem sogar 
dazu übergegangen, die positiven Auswirkungen ihrer Aktivitäten auf makroökonomische 
Faktoren wie Wachstum und Beschäftigung zu messen. 
 In Ergänzung zu diesen ganzheitlichen Untersuchungen zu den Wohlfahrtswirkungen 
wettbewerbspolitischer Aktivitäten sind ferner auch Studien zu finden, deren Ziel es im 
Wesentlichen ist, bestimmte interne Prozesse von Wettbewerbsbehörden zu evaluieren und in 
der Folge gegebenenfalls zu verbessern. Als Beispiele hierfür können eine Studie zur 
Wirksamkeit von Fusionsauflagen der Europäischen Kommission (2005) sowie eine vor 
kurzem vorgelegte Studie mit vergleichbarer Ausrichtung der zweiten britischen 
Wettbewerbsbehörde – der Competition Commission (2008) – angesehen werden.  
 Vor dem Hintergrund dieser verschiedenen Arten von Studien im Gebiet der Evaluation 
von Wettbewerbspolitik kann es nutzengenerierend sein, einen Schritt zurück zu gehen und 
sich die Frage zu stellen, wie eine Evaluation von Wettbewerbspolitik generell aufgebaut 
bzw. gestaltet sein sollte. Dieser Aufsatz liefert eine Antwort auf diese Fragestellung. 
Basierend auf der bestehenden Literatur sowie Erfahrungen mit Evaluationen in anderen 
Bereichen der Ökonomie wird eine dreistufige Methodologie entwickelt, die einerseits als 
Anleitung für konkrete Evaluationsprojekte dienen kann sowie andererseits akademisches 
Forschungspotential offenlegt.  
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The paper develops a methodology for the evaluation of competition policy. Based on the 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
The last couple of years have seen an increasing interest in the evaluation of competition 
policy. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in the UK, for instance, recently started to estimate 
the ‘positive impact’ of its activities on direct benefits to consumers. The purpose of this 
exercise is to measure the OFT's performance towards the 5:1 target agreed with the HM 
Treasury – delivering direct financial benefits to consumers of at least five times its cost to the 
taxpayer, per year, on average, over the period 2008 to 2011.1 The Dutch Competition 
Authority (NMa) follows a comparable approach to evaluate its competition policy 
enforcement and even extends the scope of the evaluation by investigating the impact of 
competition policy on macroeconomic factors such as growth and employment.2 Compared to 
these two relatively new evaluation concepts, the United States must be considered as 
relatively experienced in the evaluation of competition policy. Since 1993, the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) obliges the two US competition authorities to report on 
the effects of the undertaken actions by documenting suitable performance indicators on a 
yearly basis.3   
 These prominent examples of evaluations of entire competition policies are complemented 
by studies which concentrate on the evaluation and improvement of particular internal 
                                                            
  Department of Industrial Economics and International Management, Centre for European Economic 
Research (ZEW), Mannheim, Germany and WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management, Vallendar, 
Germany. E-mail: hueschelrath@zew.de. 
  Department of Industrial Economics and International Management, Centre for European Economic 
Research (ZEW), Mannheim, Germany. 
1   See Office of Fair Trading, “Positive Impact 07/08 - Consumer Benefits from Competition Enforcement, 
Merger Control, Market Studies and Market Investigation References, and Scam Busting” (2008).  
2  See H Don, R Kemp and J van Sinderen, “Measuring the Economic Effects of Competition Law 
Enforcement” (2008) 156 De Economist 341.  
3  See G Werden, “Assessing the Effects of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States” (2008) 156 De 
Economist 433. 
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processes of competition authorities. Examples for this category are a study on the 
effectiveness of merger remedies by the European Commission4 or a similar study recently 
published by the UK competition authorities.5  
 In addition to the internal studies conducted by the competition authorities themselves, 
academic research recently shows an increasing interest in the evaluation of competition 
policy. However, the focus of such studies is typically not on entire evaluations of the 
competition policy in a particular country but on more focused special topics – which allow a 
rigorous application of economic techniques – such as the effectiveness of merger control,6 
the effects of competition policy interventions7 or the robustness of certain methods to 
evaluate competition policy.8  
 Given the different types and scopes of recent studies in the area of evaluation of 
competition policy, it can create value to take a step backward and to raise the question of an 
appropriate general design or set-up of an evaluation of competition policy. This paper aims at 
providing an answer to this question. Based on the existing literature and experiences with 
policy evaluations in other areas of economic activity, the three-step / nine-building-blocks 
methodology provides guidance for evaluation projects and also assists in the identification of 
avenues for further academic research.  
 
B. DEVELOPING A METHODOLOGY FOR THE EVALUATION OF COMPETITION POLICY 
Although the evaluation of competition policy significantly gained importance in the last 
couple of years, the development of a methodology to guide such analyses is – compared to 
other areas such as labour market policy or innovation policy – still in its infancy. Recent 
contributions are sparse and basically consist of a process-oriented approach by Kovacic9 and 
several contributions in an issue of De Economist which was published in 2008.  
 One reason for the identified lack of research in the area might be the belief that a fixed 
methodology is simply not needed or desired – partly because it would constrain active 
thinking on the best way to approach a certain evaluation question. Although it is certainly 
true that evaluation exercises need to be flexible in order to be able to adapt the specifics of 
the project, a methodology – understood as a menu selection device – can still create value 
insofar as it helps to delineate the important steps and therefore to be consistent in the 
preparation, execution and reporting of the entire analysis. Taking into account the significant 
literature on policy evaluation in general10 and the existing approaches for labour market 
policies and innovation policies in particular,11 it is proposed to structure such a methodology 
into three stages: preparation, execution and reporting. The entire methodology is shown in 
Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
4  European Commission, “Merger Remedies Study” (2005). 
5  See Competition Commission, “Evaluation of the Competition Commission’s Past Cases” (2008). 
6  See T Duso, K Gugler and B Yurtoglu, “How Effective is European Merger Control?”, WZB Discussion 
Paper SP II 2006-12 (2006).  
7  See K Hüschelrath, “Is it Worth all the Trouble? The Costs and Benefits of Antitrust Enforcement”, ZEW 
Working Paper (2008). 
8  See M Weinberg and D Hosken, “Using Mergers to Test a Model of Oligopoly”, FTC Working Paper (2009).  
9  W Kovacic, “Using Ex-post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of Competition Policy Authorities”, 
(2006) 31 Journal of Corporation Law 503.  
10  See W Bussmann, U Klöti and P Knoepfel, Einführung in die Politikevaluation (Basel, 1997) and R 
Stockmann, Evaluationsforschung. Grundlagen und ausgewählte Forschungsfelder (Opladen, 2000), 11. 
11  See D Czarnitzki and A Fier, “Zum Stand der empirischen Wirkungsanalyse der öffentlichen Innovations- 
und Forschungsförderung” (2005).  
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Fig.1 Building blocks of a methodology for the evaluation of competition policy 
 
 
 As clarified by Figure 1, each of the three stages is subdivided into three building blocks 
which aim at substantiating the respective analysis. In the following, these nine different 
building blocks are characterised in greater detail. Technically, it is important to mention at 
this early stage that the different building blocks on the three stages must not necessarily be 
completed iteratively; on the contrary, given the interactions between the building blocks, it is 
advisable to think about a suitable setup of the respective stage simultaneously. This is 
particularly true for the following characterisation of the first stage of the methodology.  
 
1. Stage one: Preparation 
The first stage of the proposed methodology is subdivided into three building blocks: The 
identification of the evaluation object, the determination of the functions, the aims and the 
context of the evaluation and the timing of the evaluation. These three building blocks of the 
first stage are characterized separately in the following.  
 
(a) Identification of the evaluation object 
The identification of the evaluation object is of strategic importance for the success of the 
entire evaluation project. This has mostly to do with the fact that the suitable organisation of 
the subsequent building blocks depend on the chosen evaluation object. Extending the 
analysis of Niels and Van Dijk,12 at least seven evaluation objects can be differentiated: 
Competition as such, the entire competition policy of a country or a federation of countries, a 
competition law, a competition authority, specific enforcement activities or processes of a 
competition authority (such as merger control or cartel enforcement) and single decisions or 
bundles of decisions of a competition authority.   
 The various evaluation objects basically differ from each other by the degree of 
aggregation. As part of a bottom-up approach, for example, it is possible to investigate single 
decisions or bundles of decisions aiming at screening their correctness and deriving 
improvement potential. However, the identification of improvement potential might also 
                                                            
12  G Niels and R van Dijk, “Competition Policy: What are the Costs and Benefits of Measuring its Costs and 
Benefits?” (2008) 156 De Economist 351. 
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demand an evaluation of an entire area of competition policy such as merger control or cartel 
enforcement. An even higher degree of aggregation is realized if entire competition 
authorities or competition laws are evaluated – as often demanded by supervising institutions 
or undertaken by either international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) or private organisations such as the Global Competition 
Review (GCR). Finally, the highest degree of aggregation is reached as soon as competition 
as such is evaluated – probably against alternative forms of organizing an economic system. 
Such a general discussion is omitted in the remainder of the paper. 
 
(b) Determination of the functions, the aims and the context of the evaluation 
Following the definition of an evaluation object, the determination of the functions, the aims 
and the context of the evaluation is the next building block on the first stage of the 
methodology. With respect to the functions of an evaluation, the general evaluation literature 
differentiates between the knowledge function, the control function, the legitimacy function 
and the dialog function. For example, an evaluation can have the function to investigate 
reasons for wrong case decisions aiming at identifying improvement potential of internal 
processes.13 Typically, an evaluation that aims at serving this knowledge function can be 
expected to operate on a relatively low degree of aggregation, basically because an analysis 
on higher degrees would become too complex to generate reliable and usable results.   
 The control function is closely related to the knowledge function, however, concentrates to 
a larger extent on a comparison of expectations and realised performance – and might even 
trigger direct organisational and personnel changes. As an allocation of responsibilities for 
suboptimal performance levels is increasingly problematic with an increasing degree of 
aggregation, evaluations motivated by the control function either have to concentrate on 
evaluation objects with a low degree of aggregation or have to accept quite general or even 
superficial results.  
 The legitimacy function has again a potentially high significance for an evaluation of 
competition policy. This has mostly to do with the obligations by competition authorities 
around the world to furnish evaluation reports about their activities. The majority of such 
studies focus on the entire competition policy as evaluation object. Following Niels and Van 
Dijk14, the legitimacy function is the key motivation of competition authorities to undertake 
evaluation efforts.  
 Finally, the dialog function is probably the only function with a universal realisation 
potential as it typically plays a role as soon as the results of internal or external evaluations 
are made public and are therefore opened for discussion. According to Sabbatini15, although 
most evaluations focus on the legitimacy function, a publication of the results can have a 
positive effect on the competition culture in the respective country.    
 The aims of an evaluation are typically closely related to the functions and also depend on 
the choice of the evaluation object. The general evaluation literature differentiates between 
two key aims of evaluations: an assessment of the efficacy and an assessment of the efficiency 
of the effects of the respective evaluation object. With regard to an evaluation of competition 
policy, Don et al.16, for instance, separate between three aims of an evaluation of competition 
policy: meeting the accountability standards with respect to supervising institutions, 
undertaking a quality control of decisions and reviewing the effectiveness of competition law. 
                                                            
13  P Buccirossi, L Ciari, T Duso, S-O Fridolfsson, G Spagnolo and C Vitale, “A Short Overview of a 
Methodology for the Ex-Post Review of Merger Control Decisions” (2008) 156 De Economist 454. 
14  Niels and Van Dijk, supra n 12, 350.  
15  P Sabbatini, “Assessing the Impact of Antitrust Intervention by the Italian Competition Authority” (2008) 
156 De Economist 494. 
16  Don et al., supra n 2, 343. 
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Neven and Zenger17 agree that an evaluation on the one hand is an internal tool for quality 
control and on the other hand allows a comparison of the costs and benefits of competition 
policy and therefore opens possibilities for external quality control by a supervising 
institution, researchers and the public. 
 Typically, it is not advisable to follow each possible aim in one evaluation project. Given 
the identified trade-off between the degree of aggregation and the degree of detail and 
accuracy, the decision on the most suitable evaluation object should be made after a decision 
about the key aim(s) of the evaluation project. For example, a supervising institution is 
usually interested in a full evaluation of the activities of the competition authority and 
typically only has a minor interest in the reporting of detailed improvement potential.  
 In direct relation to the fixation of the aims of an evaluation, a decision must be taken 
whether the evaluation should be conducted internally or externally and for internal or 
external purposes. Generally, all four possible combinations have certain advantages and 
disadvantages which need to be traded-off against each other. Internal studies for internal 
purposes have the potential to improve internal processes as the evaluators are typically 
familiar with them and know their strengths and weaknesses. However, disadvantages which 
need to be considered are the potential for a certain blindness to the institution’s failings and 
possible obstructions to confront colleagues with bad evaluation results. The alternative of an 
external study for internal purposes solves these problems, however, might create new ones 
such as a lack of knowledge of the internal procedures or restricted access to important data 
sources. A potentially good access to data might be a key motivation to conduct an internal 
study for external purposes, however, the potential disadvantage of communicating 
suboptimal evaluation results to the public in general and to the parties involved in the wrong 
case decisions in particular, must be taken into account as well.18 The advantages and 
disadvantages of the last remaining option – an external study for external purposes – can 
basically be derived from the discussion of the alternative options so far. An argument that 
must be added is that external evaluators might have a higher expertise in the design and 
implementation of ‘state of the art’ evaluation methods than internal evaluators. However, 
they might also have a tendency to treat the authority with care during the evaluation in order 
to avoid jeopardising future working relationships as external consultants.    
 Finally, with respect to the context of an evaluation it is important to perceive the general 
conditions such as the political, social and economic environment under which the evaluation 
takes place. This is especially important for the interpretation of the results later on. 
Furthermore, special situations or motivations for undertaking an evaluation must be taken 
into account as well. An example of such a special situation could be an accumulation of 
cases lost in court which would most likely trigger an evaluation to find out about the reasons. 
Another example could be changes in the government followed by changes in the competition 
policy philosophy.        
 
(c) Timing of the evaluation 
The final building block on the first stage of the methodology is the timing of the evaluation 
project. Generally, three alternatives can be distinguished: An accompanying evaluation, an 
ex-post evaluation and an ex-ante evaluation. The choice of the timing of an evaluation again 
depends on the choice of the evaluation object. An accompanying evaluation, for example, is 
basically the only available option for an evaluation of competition as such, competition 
policy or competition law, simply because the termination of the respective activities – which 
would allow an ex-post evaluation – is not a realistic option.   
                                                            
17  D Neven and H Zenger, “Ex-post Evaluation of Enforcement: A Principal-Agent Perspective” (2008) 156 De 
Economist 477. 
18  See M Bergman, “Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? or Measuring and Evaluating the Effectiveness of 
Competition Enforcement” (2008) 156 De Economist 387.  
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 The so-called ex-post evaluation is the most prominent type of evaluation and plays the 
key role as soon as single decisions or bundles of decisions of competition authorities are 
being evaluated. Typically, such investigations take place after the cases are decided and are 
therefore open for an ex-post assessment of the decisions and its effects on the parties and the 
general market development. Typically, such an ex-post assessment compares the effects of a 
certain intervention with the counterfactual of its absence.19  
 The so-called ex-ante evaluation probably plays the smallest role in competition policy. 
This type is a suitable option as soon as possible policy reforms are discussed and an 
assessment of the potential effects on efficiency and efficacy can help to guide the decision 
into the right direction. However, it must be reminded in this respect that effectively every 
competition authority is active in the area of ex-ante evaluation as soon as merger control 
decisions are involved. As part of an evaluation project of such decisions, it is therefore 
important to consider the information situation at the time of the decision and not at the time 
of the evaluation.    
 
2. Stage two: Execution  
The second stage of the proposed methodology is subdivided into three building blocks: The 
derivation of evaluation criteria, the definition of the counterfactual and the selection and 
application of indicators and methods. These three building blocks of the second stage are 
characterized separately in the following.  
 
(a) Derivation of evaluation criteria 
An essential determinant of the success of every kind of evaluation is clarity with respect to 
the aims of competition policy. Generally, most scholars would probably agree that antitrust 
policy first and foremost aims at creating a deterrent effect by combining “the prospect of 
being subject to reasonable (and unpleasant) penalties and the serious likelihood of being 
caught while engaged in the illegal activity”.20 In other words, the key aim of competition 
policy must be seen in the prevention of (collusive or exclusive) forms of anticompetitive 
behaviour. Although such a definition certainly reflects the philosophy of competition policy 
(as opposed to regulation policy), the satisfaction level is hard to measure as basically the 
optimal degree of deterrence would need to be investigated as part of an evaluation project. 
Furthermore, in such a context, actual interventions such as detected cartels or prohibited 
mergers must be understood as a negative output of competition policy as the deterrent effect 
factually did not work in these cases.21  
 Taking these fundamental problems into account, the most straightforward way to 
operationalise the key aim of competition policy is to concentrate on its role to stimulate 
competition in order to stimulate economically efficient behaviour – which in turn is reflected 
in higher economic growth, higher productivity increases and a generally higher economic 
welfare.22 Following such an approach, an efficient antitrust policy “… consists of a set of 
effectively enforced rules that constrain the firms’ competitive strategies aiming at 
maximizing the total welfare contribution for a given enforcement budget.”23 Assuming that 
such a definition is agreed on, the follow-up question of how welfare should be defined 
immediately suggests itself. 
                                                            
19  See Neven and Zenger, supra n 17, 17, 477. 
20  J Baker, “The Case for Antitrust Enforcement” (2003) 17 Journal of Economic Perspectives 27.  
21  However, from a theoretical perspective, it is typically optimal to tolerate some degree of violation of 
competition laws as long as the damage is less than the ex ante costs of deterrence.   
22  J Van Sinderen and R Kemp, “The Economic Effect of Competition Law Enforcement: The Case of the 
Netherlands” (2008) 156 De Economist 376. 
23  K Hüschelrath, Competition Policy Analysis – An Integrated Approach (Heidelberg, 2009), 6 (highlighted by 
the authors). 
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 Given the two basic options of a consumer welfare standard and a total welfare standard, 
most economists would probably prefer a total welfare standard which, by definition, is only 
interested in the incremental change in the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. If 
the change is positive, the respective action is defined as welfare increasing and vice versa. 
However, a frequently discussed problem of such a total welfare standard is that it does not 
rule out situations in which firms increase their producer surplus at the expense of consumer 
surplus. In other words, the total welfare standard is (consciously) blind with respect to wealth 
distribution issues. For example, under a total welfare standard, a merger that is likely to 
cause significant price increases post-merger is cleared as long as the merging firms can prove 
the existence of significant merger-specific economies which at least outweigh the additional 
deadweight loss created by the price increase. The additional transformation of consumer 
surplus into producer surplus is of no relevance under a total welfare standard. As clearing a 
merger which directly leads to a price increase post-merger would be difficult to communicate 
for a competition authority, Van Sinderen and Kemp24 conclude that a consumer welfare 
standard should be the preferred option by competition authorities.   
 In addition to this practical argument, there are several further arguments for the 
application of a consumer welfare standard. Besanko and Spulber25, for example, differentiate 
between a procedural selection of the welfare standard and a conceptional selection of the 
welfare standard. Given the information asymmetries between the firms and the competition 
authority, it can be the optimal solution for the authority to follow a consumer welfare 
standard in order to reach the overall aim of total welfare maximisation. The selection of the 
consumer welfare standard is basically used as a counterweight to the information advantages 
of the firms. A comparable argument is developed by Neven and Röller26, who concentrate on 
lobbying advantages of companies as justification for the implementation of a consumer 
welfare standard.  
 However, even if an agreement on the consumer welfare standard is reached, it is still 
necessary to further specify the desired set of criteria. In particular, it must be clarified what is 
understood by consumer welfare and which determinants should enter a possible 
quantification. Although most studies concentrate on the effects of changes in the market 
price on consumer welfare, few economists would disagree that other factors such as quality, 
service or the introduction of new products can create significant value for consumers which 
would not be reflected in an analysis that solely concentrates on price. As shown by a recent 
FIPRA study27, although consumer welfare is greatly influenced by the market price in the 
short run, the medium and long run perspective suggests that the consumer welfare goal is 
best reached by focusing on efficiency and innovation. As a consequence, van Sinderen and 
Kemp28 propose to enlarge the system of objectives by including medium and long-term 
indicators such as growth, productivity and employment.  
 Despite the observed dominance of the consumer welfare standard in antitrust policy, Niels 
and van Dijk29 give cause for concern as such a standard might lead to an overactive, too 
interventionist competition authority which focuses on the realisation of short-term benefits 
for consumers while largely ignoring the negative medium- and long-term effects on the 
firm’s incentives to innovate. Furthermore, Niels and van Dijk remind that a welfare analysis 
has to take into account all affected groups such as consumers, producers, government, tax 
                                                            
24  Van Sinderen and Kemp, supra n 22, 376.  
25  D Besanko and D F Spulber (1993), “Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy” (1993) 9 Journal 
of Law, Economics, & Organization 1.  
26  D Neven and L-H Röller, “Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger 
Control” (2006) 23 International Journal of Industrial Organization 829.   
27  See P Evans, “In Search for the Marginal Customer” (2008).  
28  Van Sinderen and Kemp, supra n 22, 266.  
29  Niels and van Dijk, supra n 12, 350.  
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payer etc and has to consider all cost and benefit components which are summarised in Table 
1.  
 
Table 1: Main categories of costs and benefits of competition policy 
  Costs Benefits 
Direct (administrative) costs of the authority  
Direct costs of firms 
Regulatory compliance costs 
Costs of specific competition proceedings 
 
Economic costs to the market in question 
(negative market impacts) 
Allocative inefficiency 
Productive inefficiency 
Distortion of incentives (reduced dynamic 
competition/innovation) 
Reduced product/service quality 
Restriction on market functioning 
Economic benefits to the market in question 
(positive market impacts) 
Allocative efficiency 
Productive efficiency 
Enhanced dynamic competition/innovation 
Increased product/service quality 
Enhanced market functioning 
Indirect regulatory costs 
Regulatory uncertainty 
Likelihood of regulatory capture 
Indirect regulatory benefits 
Regulatory certainty 
Deterrent effects 
Improved quality of regulation 
Social costs (if relevant) 
Distributive costs 
Reduced security/quality of supply 
Negative effect on vulnerable customers 
Other negative externalities on society 
Social benefits (if relevant) 
Distributive benefits 
Enhanced security/quality of supply 
Positive effect on vulnerable customers 
Other positive externalities on society 
Source: Niels and van Dijk (2008, p. 355) 
As shown in Table 1, different categories of cost and benefit components can be defined. 
Without wanting to provide an exhaustive discussion of all components, two are of particular 
importance for the remainder of the paper. First, on the benefits side of competition policy, 
the value created by the deterrent effect of antitrust enforcement must be considered. Second, 
on the costs side of competition policy, it is insufficient to concentrate on the budget of the 
competition authority as the major cost factor. A presumably much higher effect is caused by 
the compliance efforts within the firms. Further cost factors include negative deterrent effects 
due to imprecise competition rules or errors of competition authorities.       
 Finally, it is important to remark that an ex-post or accompanying evaluation has to take 
into account the aims at the time of the decision – not at the time of the evaluation. As a 
consequence, it is advisable to define the aims of competition policy as clear as possible in 
order to allow a fair and effective evaluation later on. 
    
(b) Definition of the counterfactual 
Following the definition of evaluation criteria, the next step has to define a counterfactual in 
order to be able to compare the performance level of the status quo with the (likely) 
performance level if a different action or no action would have been implemented. As 
counterfactuals – by definition – cannot be observed, they must be constructed. In case of a 
prohibited merger, for example, it needs to be investigated what would have happened if the 
merger is cleared.  
 Given the various evaluation objects with different levels of aggregation, it immediately 
suggests itself that the counterfactual must be designed individually. Although it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to discuss all seven possible evaluation objects, an interesting example is 
the distinction between an evaluation of competition law and an evaluation of a competition 
authority. While a suitable counterfactual for a legislative change would be the continuation 
of the old rules or alternative reforms, a suitable counterfactual for an evaluation of a 
9 
 
competition authority is not necessarily a state of no competition policy but could be a state in 
which only the private enforcement of competition policy is feasible. As a consequence, a 
competition authority cannot claim the entire benefit of competition law enforcement and a 
closer investigation would especially need to clarify which types of enforcement benefits 
would be gained or lost in a system of private enforcement compared to a system of dual 
enforcement.30  
 On a low level of aggregation, counterfactuals need to be constructed for single case 
decisions or bundles of case decisions. Although the majority of research is devoted to this 
question with respect to merger control, a perspective on the construction of a counterfactual 
for cartel cases should be added in the following. With respect to mergers, Buccirossi et al.31 
develop a whole methodology for an ex-post review of merger control decisions including an 
elaborate thinking on the derivation of the counterfactual. Generally, the authors differ 
between three possible decisions of the competition authority: approval without remedies, 
approval with remedies and prohibition. In a second step, the behaviour of the merging parties 
must be related to the possible decisions. Basically, the parties can either decide to offer 
remedies or to refrain from doing so. Given these allocations, the counterfactuals can be 
derived as summarised in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: The relevant counterfactuals for an ex-post review of merger control decisions 
Decision of the competition 
authority 
Parties’ behaviour Counterfactuals 
Authorisation without remedies   
 No remedies offered Prohibition 
  Remedies offered Prohibition 
Authorisation with remedies 
Authorisation with remedies   
 No remedies offered - 
  Remedies offered Prohibition 
Authorisation without remedies  
Prohibition   
 No remedies offered Authorisation without remedies 
  Remedies offered Authorisation without remedies 
Authorisation with remedies 
Source: largely following Buccirossi et al. (2008, S. 457) 
 As shown in Table 2, the only possible counterfactual in case of an approval without 
remedies and the absence of a remedies proposal by the firms is the prohibition of the merger. 
This is the case because the competition authority is typically not allowed to propose 
remedies itself and an approval with remedies is therefore no valid counterfactual in such a 
situation. Table 2 further clarifies that the construction of a counterfactual is particularly 
difficult in cases in which the merging parties offered remedies, basically because this leads to 
an increase in the number of possible counterfactuals.32  
 In the case of cartel enforcement, the construction of a counterfactual looks 
straightforward. This has partly to do with the fact that a cartel is clearly defined and banned 
in many countries around the world due to its clearly negative welfare implications. As a 
consequence, the competition authority is unlikely to make any errors in its decisions. 
However, it is nevertheless necessary to derive a counterfactual that reflects the (likely) 
market developments in the absence of the cartel agreement to subsequently derive the 
incremental welfare effects of the intervention. For the calculation of this welfare differential, 
                                                            
30  Ibid, 357.      
31  Buccirossi et al., supra n 13.   
32  See generally Buccirossi et al., ibid, for a detailed description. 
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it is of no particular interest for how long the cartel already existed – this question will be 
assessed in court as part of the public and private lawsuits – but how long the cartel would 
have continued to exist without the intervention of the competition authority. The detailed 
approach will be sketched in the following section. 
             
(c) Selection and application of indicators and methods 
Following the derivation of evaluation criteria and the definition of the counterfactual, the 
selection and application of indicators and methods is the next consecutive step in the 
proposed methodology. Generally, indicators aim at making the aims and criteria observable 
and measurable. In particular, it must be decided which criteria are considered as especially 
relevant for the specific evaluation project and how these criteria should be measured. 
Subsequently, the selection and application of suitable methods has to commence.   
 In principle, the selection and application of indicators and methods depend on the 
evaluation object. Although it would be generally desirable to discuss the indicators and 
methods for all seven evaluation objects, the remainder of this section concentrates on 
particularly two objects: selected case decisions or bundles of case decisions and the entire 
competition policy. Most existing studies can be related to one of those two evaluation 
objects. 
Selected case decisions or bundles of case decisions as evaluation object 
As already discussed above, an evaluation of selected case decisions or bundles of case 
decisions can be motivated by several aims. Assuming for the time being that the key aim of 
such an investigation lies in the identification and realisation of improvement potential of the 
internal processes, the subsequent step has to decide on the appropriate welfare standard. If a 
consumer welfare standard is chosen, the measurement of the following key indicators is 
typically suggested: market price, transaction volume, product quality and product diversity. 
Although these rather short-term indicators will play the key role in the following, the 
importance of medium- and long-term indicators such as economic growth, productivity or 
employment is generally acknowledged. However, it is rather unlikely that selected case 
decisions or (smaller) bundles of case decisions have a significant measurable impact on such 
macroeconomic indicators. In the following, the analysis is separated into methods to evaluate 
merger control decisions and the effects of cartel enforcement.   
 
Methods to evaluate merger control decisions 
Starting from the key aim of merger control – the maximisation of its contribution to 
consumer welfare – the degree of achievement is typically increasing with decreasing prices, 
increasing sales as well as increasing product quality and diversity. The key objective for an 
evaluation now lies in the monitoring of changes in these indicators since the decision and to 
compare these results to the counterfactual scenario. Based on Table 2 above, Buccirossi et 
al.33 propose a separate methodological approach for every single combination of decision by 
the competition authority and the behaviour of the parties. In the following, only the first case 
(Authorisation without remedies / no remedies offered / prohibition) and the last but one case 
(Prohibition / no remedies offered / authorisation without remedies) will be briefly sketched.      
 In case of an authorisation without remedies where the merging parties did not offer any 
remedies, the only possible counterfactual is the prohibition (as the competition authority is 
not allowed to take the initiative in proposing remedies). As a consequence, the consumer 
welfare effects of the authorisation of the merger must be compared to the (hypothetical) 
situation of the prohibition of the merger. Such an analysis can be conducted in two steps. In a 
first step, the changes in the key indicators – such as price or quality – are observed. If it is, 
                                                            
33  Ibid.  
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for example, found that the price decreased after the merger, this suggests a correct merger 
decision as consumer welfare likely increased post-merger. However, as these effects are not 
necessarily caused by the merger but can be driven by external factors, the second step has to 
investigate econometrically to what extent a causality between the key consumer welfare 
indicators and the merger exists. In this context, Buccirossi et al.34 develop a detailed list of 
possible hypotheses and empirical research strategies.  
 The second exemplary case sketched here – a prohibition where the merging parties did not 
offer any remedies – is more complicated to investigate. This has basically to do with the fact 
that the observable market developments after the merger are of no particular help for the 
derivation of a hypothesis which could be tested subsequently. As a consequence, it is only 
possible to define and test a causality between a hypothetical merger and its hypothetical 
effects on consumer welfare.  
 Based on this partly sketched methodological framework, Buccirossi et al.35 collect and 
describe the key empirical methods which might be used in an ex-post evaluation of merger 
control decisions. In general, these methods include simulations, structural models, policy 
evaluation methods (i.e. natural experiments and matching methods), event studies and 
surveys. Table 3 gives a broad overview of the methods and their key strengths and 
weaknesses.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
34  Ibid, 460. 
35  Ibid, 464.  
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Table 3: A selection of methods for the evaluation of merger control decisions 
Method Characterisation Strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) 
Simulation 
 
 
 
Simulations apply oligopoly models to 
estimate the effect of (hypothetical) 
changes in market structure on market 
performance. E.g., in a merger context, 
simulation tools allow the calculation of 
hypothetical price increases if the 
merger would have been cleared. 
+ Based on a clearly defined 
      theoretical framework 
+ Allows a quantification of effects 
+ Allows sensitivity checks 
- Simplifying assumptions 
- Evaluation of the method revealed 
      partly disappointing performances  
Structural model 
 
 
 
Structural models estimate the 
parameters of a set of structural 
equations which characterise the 
respective market of interest. The 
equations are derived from oligopoly 
models. The estimated parameters are 
applied to simulate possible scenarios 
which allow an ex-post evaluation. 
+ Based on a clearly defined 
      theoretical and empirical framework 
+ Allows various specifications of de- 
      mand and competitive interaction  
+ Allows sensitivity checks 
- Trade-off between applicability and 
      accuracy of the estimations 
- High data requirements 
Natural experiment and  
matching-method 
 
 
Both methods rely on a market- or firm-
based comparison of two distinct 
groups: a control-group and an 
experimental group. It is assumed that 
an analysis of the differences in the 
performance of both groups can be 
related to the effect of the intervention. 
+ Frequently and flexibly applicable 
+ Low to medium data requirements 
+ Allows a quantification of effects 
- Accuracy of results depend on de- 
      gree of similarity of control group 
- Possible endogeneity problems 
Event study 
 
 
 
 
Event studies aim at measuring the 
effects of particular events on firm 
value. In the context of merger control, 
an analysis of the stock price reactions 
of the competitors at the time of the 
announcement of the merger and the 
decision allows to draw conclusions on 
the motivation behind the merger as 
well as the correctness of the decision.  
+ Based on a clearly defined empirical 
      framework 
+ Allows a separation of the effects of 
      the merger and the decision 
+ Low data requirements 
- Only applicable for listed firms 
- Simplifying assumptions 
- Evaluation of the method revealed 
      partly disappointing performances 
Survey 
 
 
 
Surveys aim at collecting mostly 
qualitative information by conducting 
interviews or submitting questionnaires. 
Surveys focus on a representative cross-
section of the relevant population 
including competitors and customers.   
+ Frequently and flexibly applicable 
+ Complements the other methods as it 
      allows interpretation of results and  
      plausibility checks 
- Risk of low return/participation rates 
- Results can underlie response and 
      interviewer biases 
Source: inspired by the detailed characterisation in Buccirossi et al. (2008) 
 Generally, Table 3 leaves the impression that every technique has its particular strengths 
and weaknesses and that a suitable selection of the method depends on the question to be 
investigated, the market characteristics as well as the available data. Ideally, different methods 
are combined in order to allow robustness checks of the derived results.   
 Given the characterisation of the key methods for an evaluation of merger control 
decisions, the economic literature discusses an ample number of problems and challenges 
with their application. Sabbatini36 stresses the point that an application of quantitative 
methods typically demands two data sets – the one from the investigation and a new one 
                                                            
36  Sabbatini, supra n 15, 496. 
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reflecting market developments in the aftermath of the decision. It often turns out to be 
difficult to get access to both (structurally identical) data sets as competition authorities are 
typically not allowed or willing to hand over data sets to third parties and firms cannot be 
forced to provide new data sets.      
 Neven and Zenger37 raise the general question, whether an ex-post evaluation of merger 
control decisions should concentrate on authorised or prohibited mergers. Authorised mergers 
are typically easier to investigate as the counterfactual can be derived by studying post-merger 
market developments. An additional advantage can be seen in the creation of knowledge 
whether the decision of the competition authority was correct. However, a key problem of 
constraining the analysis to authorised mergers must be seen in the limitation of the analysis 
to type 2 errors while ignoring type 1 errors38. As a consequence, incentives are created for 
the competition authority to keep type 2 errors small at the expense of type 1 errors – possibly 
leading to an overly active competition authority.   
 Furthermore, Neven and Zenger39 also remind of the potential relevance of the point in time 
at which the evaluation is conducted. Given the fact that the market power effects of a merger 
typically materialise relatively shortly after the merger while the realisation of merger 
efficiencies might take significantly more time, the point in time at which the evaluation is 
conducted can have a clear influence on its results. 
 Additionally, it must be reminded that post-merger price increases as such do not allow the 
immediate conclusion that consumer welfare has decreased in the aftermath of the merger. In 
principle, it is possible that a better product quality or variety or positive medium- and long-
term effects on eg innovation incentives and possibilities can overcompensate the (possibly) 
only short-term negative effects of elevated prices on consumer welfare.      
 In addition to a quantification of the welfare effects of certain case decisions, there are 
possibilities to evaluate the entire merger control activities of a competition authority.40  For 
example, the last years have seen a couple of studies on the effectiveness of merger remedies 
in both practice41 and academia.42 Generally, these studies aim at investigating the effects and 
effectiveness of merger remedies.     
 
Methods to evaluate the effects of cartel enforcement 
The general approach to evaluate the welfare effects of cartel enforcement is straightforward. 
Starting from the observed (elevated) cartel price, a so-called ‘but-for’ price needs to be 
derived. This is the price that (likely) would have existed in the absence of the cartel. The 
difference between the cartel price and the ‘but-for’ price must be multiplied by the sales of 
the cartel (for the entire cartel period) in order to receive a first estimate of the consumer 
welfare implications of the cartel and its detection.  
 However, despite this rather simple general approach, practical applications regularly 
experience several challenges. For example, it is sometimes hard to derive a single market 
price, to estimate the exact length of the cartel, to estimate the size of the pass-on effects to 
subsequent stages in the value chain or to consider the impact of taxes. Furthermore, a 
particular challenge is the derivation of the ‘but-for’ price. Economic research has developed 
                                                            
37  Neven and Zenger, supra n 17, 483.  
38  Basically, a competition authority in an imperfect world is confronted with two basic kinds of antitrust errors. 
On the one hand, the authority might detect an instance of harmful behaviour which in fact is not harmful (a 
so-called type I error). On the other hand, the authority might come to the conclusion that a certain behaviour 
is not harmful although it is in fact harmful (a so-called type II error). Generally, antitrust errors harm social 
welfare directly by undertaking wrong enforcement decisions and indirectly via the consequential reduction 
in the deterrent effect of fines. 
39  Neven and Zenger, supra n 17, 485. 
40  See generally Hüschelrath, supra n 23, 78.  
41  See, eg, Federal Trade Commission, “A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process” (1999). 
42  See, eg, Duso et al., supra n 6.  
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ample methods for its estimation such as the application of market prices before or after the 
cartel, prices in comparable competitive markets, price simulations with oligopolistic models 
or the derivation of the ‘but-for’ price by applying cost data and adding a typical rate of return 
for the respective industry.43 The choice of the most suitable method basically depends on the 
respective market and data situation. For example, if there are indications that tacit collusion 
was present before the detected cartel, a pre- or post-cartel market price might not act as a 
suitable ‘but-for’ price.44 Furthermore, simulations are often only an available option in 
homogeneous markets and a comparison with similar (but competitive) markets is only as 
good as the fit between the cartelised market and the comparator competitive market.      
 The discussion on the evaluation of cartel enforcement so far is identical to the calculation 
of damages in private law suits. However, such a procedure is necessarily focusing on the 
harm caused by the cartel in the past, while the interest of an evaluation is more the question 
of how significant the losses would have been if the cartel was not detected and continued to 
operate. As a consequence, as part of an evaluation of cartel enforcement, an estimate of the 
remaining life of the cartel must be derived. One option in this respect would be to use 
historical average cartel length data and to subtract the operating time of the cartel before its 
detection. However, given the different costs and benefits of cartel agreements in different 
industries, it is sensible to apply at least average industry values on cartel length. Ideally, the 
case at hand provides insights on the expected remaining life of the cartel.   
 In addition to a quantification of the welfare effects of certain case decisions, there are 
certain possibilities to evaluate the entire cartel enforcement policy of a competition authority. 
Generally, it is a difficult undertaking to interpret the number of detected cartels from an 
evaluation perspective, basically because a small number can suggest a successful deterrent 
policy but could also be an indicator of a poor cartel enforcement policy. Given this 
identification problem, the economic literature has identified several indirect ways to assess 
cartel enforcement policies. For example, it is possible to compare a best practice enforcement 
framework with the status quo in a competition authority,45 to compare the theoretically 
optimal fines for cartelisation with the fines actually imposed by the competition authority or 
the court46 or to investigate the sustainability of the effects of the detection of the cartel on 
post-cartel market prices and market competition.47           
Entire competition policy as evaluation object 
Following the discussion of selected case decisions or bundles of case decisions, this section 
focuses on the entire competition policy as evaluation object. For presentation purposes, the 
analysis is separated into two sub-sections. The following sub-section discusses 
methodological approaches in practice while the subsequent sub-section focuses on academic 
attempts to evaluate the entire competition policy.    
 
Methods applied in practice 
The key aim of an evaluation of the entire competition policy in practice is to meet the 
respective obligations from supervising institutions. As it will be shown in the following, the 
methods applied in such studies are – at least partly – so inexact that they can hardly be used 
to derive detailed improvement potentials.   
                                                            
43  See generally T Van Dijk and F Verboven, “Quantification of Damages”, University of Antwerp Working 
Paper (2005).  
44  See J Harrington, “How Do Cartels Operate?” (2006).  
45  See Hüschelrath, supra n 23, 199.  
46  See C Veljanovski, “Cartel Fines in Europe: Law, Practice and Deterrence” (2007) 29 World Competition.  
47  R Feinberg, “Strategic and Deterrent Pricing Responses to Antitrust Investigations” (1984) 2 International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 75 and N De Roos, “Examining Models of Collusion: The Market for 
Lysine” (2006) 24 International Journal of Industrial Organization 1083.  
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 To a certain extent the only exception to this initial statement is an ex-post evaluation 
instrument which on the one hand operates on a case-by-case basis and on the other hand 
evaluates the decisions of the competition authority on a permanent basis: the investigations 
and decisions by courts. Generally, every firm (or individual, respectively) that is confronted 
with a disadvantageous decision of a competition authority has the possibility for a review by 
the responsible court. Given this form of ex-post assessment, if now the decisions of the 
competition authority (in a certain area) are frequently corrected or annulled by a court, a 
suboptimal performance of the authority seems likely. Although, on the surface, it is 
appealing to take the success rate of decisions of the competition authority before court as a 
key indicator for an evaluation, Bergman48 identifies several important drawbacks of such an 
indicator. For example, not every type of decision of a competition authority is challenged in 
court with the same probability leading to significant biases in such an evaluation. 
Furthermore, the decision of the court is concentrating on law-related arguments and is not 
particularly driven by the economic implications of the respective cases. Additionally, a 
competition authority which is evaluated on the basis of the success rate in court has 
incentives to concentrate on rather small cases as the probability of a subsequent investigation 
in court is reduced significantly.       
 In addition to a measurement of the success rate in court, several other methods exist to 
directly assess the (superficial) outputs of a competition authority. Examples for such methods 
or indicators are the number of investigated and decided cases, the average length of an 
investigation, the number of published guidelines or the intensity of interaction with other 
competition authorities. However, as already argued above, such indicators are difficult to 
interpret and of limited general relevance. Nevertheless, they might reveal important 
information if the respective numbers are compared for one particular competition authority 
over time.  
 Apart from a compilation and assessment of various output-related indicators, other 
periodical evaluations of the entire competition policy are available. The OECD, for instance, 
regularly organises peer reviews to evaluate the competition policy of particular countries.49 
Additionally, the OECD calculates a ‘Competition Law and Policy Indicator’ for all its 
member countries which aims at reflecting the state of two important policies for the 
promotion of competition – competition policy and deregulation policy – into a single 
indicator and therefore allows country-to-country comparisons.50 Additionally, private 
institutions such as the Global Competition Review (GCR) are active in the field of evaluation 
of competition policy. The GCR, for example, evaluates and ranks the competition authorities 
in many countries around the word on a yearly basis. The underlying data is gathered partly 
by interviews among the peer group and partly by surveys among antitrust lawyers. Recently, 
academic studies have partly been based on GCR data comparing the competition policy 
regimes.51  
  In addition to courts and several organisations, the competition authorities themselves are 
active in the evaluation of competition policy. The Office of Fair Trading in the UK, for 
instance, recently started to estimate the ‘positive impact’ of its activities on direct benefits to 
consumers. The purpose of this exercise is to measure the OFT's performance towards the 5:1 
target agreed with the HM Treasury – delivering direct financial benefits to consumers of at 
                                                            
48  Bergman, supra n 18, 389.  
49  See, eg, OECD, “Country Studies - Ukraine - Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy” (2008).  
50  See J Høj, M Jimenez, M Maher, G Nicoletti, and M Wise (2007) “Product Market Competition in the OECD 
Countries: Taking Stock and Moving Forward”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 575 
(2007).   
51  See especially M Nicholson, “An Antitrust Law Index for Empirical Analysis of International Competition 
Policy” (2008) 4 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 1009 and M Nicholson, “Quantifying Antitrust 
Regimes” (2007) 3 Erasmus Law and Economics Review 41.   
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least five times its cost to the taxpayer, per year, on average, over the period 2008 to 2011.52 
The Dutch Competition Authority NMa follows a comparable approach to evaluate its 
competition policy enforcement and even extents the scope of the evaluation by investigating 
the impact of competition policy on macroeconomic factors such as growth and 
employment.53  
 Compared to these two relatively new evaluation concepts, the United States must be 
considered as relatively experienced in the evaluation of competition policy. Since 1993, the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) obliges the two US competition 
authorities to report on the effects of the undertaken actions by documenting suitable 
performance indicators on a yearly basis.54 In all three cases, a so-called bottom-up approach 
is followed which starts at case decision level and tries to apply rules of thumb or simple 
simulation models to estimate the consumer welfare implications. This data is aggregated 
within the different areas and subsequently for the entire competition authority to make a final 
comparison of the overall benefits with the overall costs feasible. In the following, the 
evaluation approaches of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and UK Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) are sketched exemplarily with respect to merger control and cartel enforcement.  
 The evaluation approach of the DOJ follows the aim of measuring the consumer savings 
due to antitrust enforcement in the areas of merger control as well as the enforcement of 
cartels and cases of abuse of dominance.55 In merger control, a rough estimate of the 
consumer savings is derived by multiplying the yearly revenues in the relevant market with 
the likely price increase that would have been observed in the absence of merger control. The 
likely price increases are typically derived by applying simple simulation tools. In 
differentiated final consumer markets, a differentiated Bertrand-type model provides the basis 
for the analysis, while the price increases of mergers in all other markets are derived from the 
application of a Cournot-type model.  
 In the area of cartel enforcement, the DOJ estimates the consumer savings by applying a 
simple rule.56 For cartels that existed one year or longer, consumer savings of 10% of the 
yearly revenues in the relevant market are included on the benefits side of the calculation. For 
cartels which existed less than a year, consumer savings of 10% of the yearly revenues in the 
relevant market for the duration of the cartel are taken as benefits estimate. The 10% value is 
justified as an estimate of the average price effect of a cartel. However, given that recent 
economic research finds an average cartel overcharge across all studies of 28.1%, the estimate 
must be considered as quite defensive.57 A further assumption which speaks for an 
underestimation of the effect must be seen in the practice, that the benefit of the detection of a 
cartel only enters the benefits calculation once – in the year of the detection. Again, casting an 
eye on existing economic research reveals cartel durations of up to 100 years; therefore, it 
seems likely that – without the detection success – the average cartel would have caused harm 
for much longer than one year.      
    In the UK, the OFT regularly reports on the ‘positive impact’ of its actions on consumer 
welfare. The investigation – which started in the business year 2005/06 – includes not only 
merger control and cartel enforcement but also most other areas of competition policy and 
consumer protection.58 The general evaluation approach is similar to the DOJ approach 
                                                            
52  See Office of Fair Trading, supra n 1. 
53  See Don et al., supra n 2. 
54  See Werden, supra n 3.  
55  Ibid.  
56  Ibid.  
57  See generally J Connor and J Zimmerman, “Determinants of Cartel Duration: A Cross-Sectional Study of 
Modern Private International Cartels”, Purdue University Working Paper (2005).    
58  See Office of Fair Trading, “Positive Impact: An Initial Evaluation of the Effect of the Competition 
Enforcement Work conducted by the Office of Fair Trading” (2005) and Office of Fair Trading, “Positive 
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described above, however, the OFT continuously improved the evaluation concept and the 
evaluation methods in the last years. In its most recent assessment, for example, the OFT 
dropped the very simplifying assumption of a 1% price increase for every prohibited or 
remedied merger and now applies merger simulation tools whenever possible.59 Additionally, 
the duration of the consumer welfare effect of the respective enforcement actions was 
extended from one year to two years. In the area of cartel enforcement the estimation of the 
(hypothetical) remaining life of detected cartels was improved by introducing a new concept. 
For cartels which operated seven years or less at the time of the detection, a remaining life of 
six years is assumed. For cartels which already operated more than seven years at the time of 
the detection, the remaining life is approximated by multiplying the actual life with the factor 
1.4 and subtracting 3.5 years.  
 Given this short foray through the evaluation concepts of the DOJ and the OFT, a couple 
of methodological problems or challenges are obvious. For example, both concepts assume 
that the competition authority was always right in their decisions. Although such an 
assumption might be reasonable for cartel enforcement, it is probably not for merger control 
and the other areas of competition policy. A further problem lies in the failure of both 
concepts to include the deterrent effect of competition policy enforcement into the evaluation. 
Given the frequent statements that the deterrent effect is probably the most important effect of 
competition policy enforcement, the question about the value of an evaluation which leaves 
out this effect immediately suggests itself.60 A further critical point must be seen in the failure 
to secure a balanced comparison of costs and benefits. It must be considered suboptimal to 
invest substantial resources in the more and more sophisticated measuring of the benefits of 
competition policy to then continue with a comparison of this value with the budget of the 
competition authority. A balanced comparison of the costs and benefits demands an equally 
sophisticated assessment of the respective costs such as compliance efforts by firms, business 
chilling effects (i.e. negative deterrent effects) due to imprecise competition rules or the costs 
of running the respective parts of the law system. 
 In addition to these general drawbacks of the approaches, there are a couple of more 
specific critical aspects. For example, the studies measure consumer welfare basically only 
with respect to price changes, largely ignoring other determinants of consumer welfare or 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Impact 06/07 - Consumer Benefits from Competition Enforcement, Merger Control, and Scam Busting“ 
(2007a). 
59  See Office of Fair Trading, “Consumer Savings from Merger Control. Merger Simulation for Impact 
Estimation” (2007b).  
60  A recent study by Deloitte on behalf of the OFT tries to tackle this key problem. Interestingly, the aim of the 
study was not to simply detect indications for the existence of a deterrent effect but to measure its size in 
relation to the direct effects realized in the areas of cartels, mergers and abuses of dominant positions. In 
order to reach this aim, 30 expert interviews were conducted between May and November 2006 among 
antitrust lawyers, economists and firms. These efforts were complemented by two telephone-based surveys: 
the first survey addressing 234 antitrust lawyers and the second survey addressing 202 firms (all belonging to 
the ‘more than 200 employees’ category) in the UK. As part of this extensive survey, the deterrent effect of, 
eg, merger control was measured as number of merger plans that were abandoned or modified after 
consulting external lawyers but before the OFT was informed about the plans relative to the number of 
mergers in which a substantial lessening of competition was found during an OFT investigation. The results 
for the survey of the lawyers show for the period from 2000 to 2006 a ratio of 5 to 1 for merger control and 
cartel enforcement and a ratio of 10 to 1 for abuses of dominant positions – in all cases reflecting the 
relationship of the deterrent effect and the direct effect. Gordon und Squires interpret these estimates as 
rather defensive given the fact that the study only focused on merger plans which were abandoned or 
modified after consulting external lawyers. In practice, especially large companies might provide the 
respective consulting services in-house and are therefore not reflected in the results. This conjecture is 
confirmed by the complementary survey of firms which finds that on average only one out of four merger 
plans is discussed with external lawyers. See Deloitte, “The Deterrent Effect of Competition Enforcement by 
the OFT” (2007) and F Gordon and D Squires, “The Deterrent Effect of UK Competition Enforcement” 
(2008) 156 De Economist 418.   
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other damages caused by cartels, respectively. With respect to the cartel enforcement 
approach, both concepts ignore deadweight losses and possible umbrella effects. Furthermore, 
the approaches to derive the (hypothetical) remaining life of cartels at least demand further 
discussions. Following a hypothesis by Shughart and Tollison61, a competition authority tends 
to detect over proportionally many inefficient cartels which are at the border of breaking apart 
anyway, leaving the really successful cartels undetected. Furthermore, economic research has 
partly confirmed market price decreases after the detection of the cartel, however, also found 
significant price increases relatively shortly afterwards. If such behaviour can be observed 
regularly, the medium- and long-term deterrent effect of cartel enforcement might be 
significantly smaller than initially expected. Given the multitude of problems to measure the 
effects of the entire competition policy, Neven and Zenger62 raise the question to what extent 
it is sensible to regularly burn resources for such heavily built investigations.      
 
Methods applied in academia 
In addition to the practical approaches to evaluate the entire competition policy of a country, 
there are a couple of methodological approaches in academia which try to address this issue. 
For example, the probably oldest studies which can be interpreted as evaluation studies are 
estimations of the size of the deadweight losses for industries and even whole economies. 
Based on the well-known relationship between the deadweight loss and the price-cost margin, 
the industry revenues and the price elasticity of market demand, Harberger63 and other 
researchers after him tried to approximate the size of deadweight loss (expressed in % of 
GNP) and were partly surprised by its relatively small size. However, if further welfare losses 
due to market power such as rent seeking expenditures or productive inefficiencies are taken 
into account, the negative effect of market power – and therefore the positive effect of 
competition policy – grows significantly.64 However, in addition to several severe 
methodological problems of these approaches, in particular, they do not offer a possibility to 
derive a counterfactual. Therefore, the key message of these early contributions is that even if 
competition policy only has a tiny influence on competition in an economy, the resulting 
positive effects on welfare can be quite substantial.  
 George Stigler can be considered as pioneer of studies which compare the market outcomes 
in economies or industries with a) other countries without a comparable degree of antitrust 
enforcement, b) periods before and after certain legislative changes went into force, or c) 
industries which enjoyed some form of antitrust immunity.65 To give a specific example of 
such a type of analysis, Baker66 evaluates evidence from four episodes of no or lax antitrust 
enforcement in the US and basically finds that periods of relaxed antitrust enforcement 
showed an increase in anticompetitive behaviour such as cartel formation or anticompetitive 
horizontal mergers. He therefore concludes that “[c]ompetition does not invariably happen by 
itself”67, as firms have incentives to restrict competition either collusively or exclusively. 
 Also in the spirit of the work of Stigler is the contribution of Warzynski.68 He tests whether 
antitrust policy had an impact on the price-cost margins in the US manufacturing industry. His 
results indicate the presence of market power in many industries but also substantial 
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heterogeneity of behaviour, across both time and industries. However, he concludes that 
price-cost margins were significantly lower when the antitrust policy was tough. Furthermore, 
Konings et al.69 investigate the impact of competition policy on the level and the dynamics of 
firm price-cost margins in the Belgian and Dutch manufacturing industries. Belgium 
significantly strengthened their competition law in 1993, while the Netherlands followed a 
more lenient approach until the very end of the last century. The empirical results show that 
the reform of competition policy in Belgium did not have any significant effect on the price-
cost margins in Belgium. However, a comparison between Belgium and the Netherlands 
revealed that price-cost margins in the Netherlands were significantly higher than those in 
Belgium.  
 With respect to cartel enforcement, there are several studies which shed some light on the 
importance and value of the deterrent effect. Block et al.70, for example, find for the US bread 
industry that an increase in the DOJ’s enforcement capacity or filing of a DOJ price-fixing 
complaint had a negative effect on the price mark-ups. Furthermore, Block and Feinstein71 
find evidence on the existence of a deterrent effect in highway construction procurement 
auctions. Clarke and Evenett72 show for the case of the international vitamins cartel that the 
cartel reduced its overcharges in jurisdictions with tough cartel enforcement. For most 
European jurisdictions, this reduction in overcharges reached by the presence of tough cartel 
enforcement regimes was already large enough to cover a substantial proportion of the overall 
budgets of the respective antitrust authorities (including the budget of DG Competition at the 
European Commission). Finally, Symeonidis73 analyses the effect of the introduction of anti-
cartel laws in the United Kingdom in 1956 and finds that price competition increased and led 
to lower margins in industries which had been previously cartelized.  
3. Stage three: Reporting 
The third stage of the proposed methodology is subdivided into three building blocks: The 
derivation and interpretation of results, an appraisal of the significance of the results and the 
derivation of conclusions. These three building blocks of the third stage are characterised 
separately in the following.  
 
(a) Derivation and interpretation of results 
Following the selection and application of indicators and methods on the previous stage, the 
derivation and interpretation of the results of an evaluation is the natural starting point on the 
reporting stage. Dependent on the evaluation object, the aims of the evaluation and the 
applied methods, it might not only be necessary to interpret single results but also to initially 
aggregate single results to an overall result. For example, as part of an evaluation of a 
competition authority, although the results for the different activities were derived on the 
preceding stage, the aggregation to an overall benefit and a comparison to the overall costs 
needs to take place on the third stage. As part of such an exercise, the introduction of different 
weightings for the various criteria or results might be suitable. 
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 Following the derivation of the results, they have to be interpreted. In particular, it is 
important to identify the important drivers of the results and to draft suggestions for 
improvement. If this is not possible – possibly due to a high level of aggregation of the 
evaluation – there is still a need to identify problematic areas which can be investigated more 
closely in the aftermath (see especially the subsequent building block).    
 A last aspect that needs to be considered within this building block is the question of how 
to communicate the results of the evaluation. As already sketched on the first stage, internal 
studies on the one hand have the disadvantage of foreclosing external quality control and 
suggestions of improvement ideas. On the other hand, it must be considered that the 
communication of the evaluation results can also have negative effects on the internal 
incentives of the authority as such as well as individual employees.74 Additionally, the 
publication of erroneous decisions might cause legal problems for the competition authority if 
the parties involved decide to sue.   
 
(b) Appraisal of the significance of the results  
Technically, an appraisal of the significance of the results can be seen as part of the 
interpretation of the results sketched in the preceding section. However, given its importance 
for the overall success of the evaluation, the proposed methodology considers it separately. In 
particular, this building block follows the aim of identifying the key results together with the 
underlying key assumptions as well as the general weaknesses or methodological challenges.  
 In general, the discussion on the previous stages of the methodology identified several 
potential methodological problems of an evaluation of competition policy. With respect to the 
first stage, the clear identification of an evaluation object is as important as the respective 
harmonisation with the functions, the aims and the context of the evaluation. In particular, the 
prioritisation of aims and potential problems experienced during the evaluation – such as 
severe data constraints, doubts on the independence of the evaluation team or weaknesses in 
the application of certain methods – should be discussed on this occasion. This includes an 
appraisal of the question to what extent the context of the evaluation drives the observed 
results. 
 With respect to the second stage, the derivation of the evaluation criteria for the chosen 
evaluation object is of great importance for an appraisal of the significance of the results. This 
is especially true for cases in which the aims and criteria are not as clearly defined as 
necessary. The same conclusion is basically true for the selection of indicators. Given the 
diversity of possible indicators, it is virtually impossible to consider all of them in an 
evaluation. As a consequence, it needs to be discussed why the respective selection was 
considered as optimal and what would be the likely effects of changes in the indicators on the 
final results. This includes an appraisal of the role of interactions and overlaps of different 
policy actions.  
 The probably largest degree of freedom is present in the selection and application of 
methods. Given this flexibility, a detailed explanation of the chosen method is pivotal. This is 
particularly true in cases where sub-samples of cases are investigated and the question is 
raised how this sub-sample relates to the population (i.e. the potential problem of sample 
selection biases). Furthermore, simplifying assumptions such as the abstraction from 
deadweight losses or the use of average cartel lengths have to be expressed clearly. In case of 
efficiency or effectiveness analyses, it is of great importance to provide a detailed appraisal of 
possible over- or underestimations of the true costs and benefits of certain actions. Following 
the detailed assessment by van Sinderen and Kemp75 a purely static assessment of the welfare 
effects of competition policy might miss a large fraction of the positive (or negative) spill-
over effects in either the same or adjacent markets. A further factor which is usually 
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connected to an underestimation of the benefits of competition policy is the deterrent effect of 
antitrust enforcement. As long as only the direct effects enter a quantification leaving out the 
potentially more important deterrent effect, an evaluation exercise is necessarily incomplete.76  
 In addition to an underestimation of the benefits, the opposite possibility needs to be 
considered as well. As argued by van Sinderen and Kemp77, the benefits might be overstated 
due to the failure to consider switching to alternative products following a price increase or 
the negative effects on innovation and economic growth a decision of a competition authority 
(based on short-term indicators) might cause. A further important welfare decreasing effect is 
created by wrong case decisions of competition authorities and their negative spill-over 
effects on firm decisions in the future. 
 However, the probably most important message in this building block is that in order to 
secure a balanced comparison of costs and benefits, it is suboptimal to invest substantial 
resources in the more and more sophisticated measuring of the benefits of competition policy 
to then continue with a comparison of this value to the budget of the competition authority. A 
balanced comparison of the costs and benefits demands an equally sophisticated assessment 
of the respective costs such as compliance efforts by firms, business chilling effects (i.e. 
negative deterrent effects) due to imprecise competition rules or the costs of running the 
respective parts of the law system.  
              
(c) Derivation of conclusions   
The final step of the methodology aims at initiating learning and implementation processes. A 
key technical aspect in this respect is the effects of the evaluation (results) on the incentives of 
the authority in general and the individual employees in particular. For example, a 
suboptimally conducted and/or communicated evaluation might not only interfere with the 
individual motivations of the employees but might also lead to incentives to reallocate parts of 
the authorities’ budget in a way which is detrimental to the desired maximisation of the 
positive welfare impact of competition policy. Following an example by Neven and Zenger78, 
an authority which is evaluated solely by its contribution to consumer welfare has an 
incentive to focus their enforcement efforts on large cases while ignoring the smaller cases. 
However, such a development might cause a suboptimal overall antitrust enforcement as also 
an enforcement of smaller cases can have an important signal function which directly feeds 
into the important (and valuable) deterrent effect of antitrust enforcement.     
 A further question which needs to be addressed on the final stage refers to the repetition 
cycle of evaluations. With respect to an evaluation of the entire competition policy – as 
demanded by several supervisory institutions – the question needs to be raised whether it is 
sensible to repeat such a full evaluation every year. As argued by Neven and Zenger79, it does 
not make much sense to invest a significant budget every year in a full evaluation of 
competition policy activities although it is clear beforehand that the benefits will dwarf the 
costs anyway. Bergman80 adds that the impossibility to measure a key benefit of competition 
policy enforcement – the deterrent effect – questions the value of cost-benefit comparisons 
generally. A greater potential for new insights is identified by promoting initiatives to create 
data and methodological standards which would allow benchmarking exercises for 
competition authorities. Generally, it might be worth thinking about conducting a full 
evaluation of competition policy every three to four years and to use the evaluation budget in 
the other years for more detailed investigations of certain activities or even selected cases or 
bundles of cases.  
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 However, the probably most important question of the final building block of the final 
stage is how the results of the evaluation should be used further. In this respect, Buccirossi et 
al.81 as well as Bergman82 argue that it does not make much sense to solely focus on a 
quantification of the costs and benefits without taking the additional step of an assessment of 
the possibilities to improve the decision processes within the competition authority. In 
particular, it is not sufficient to know that a particular decision was wrong but it additionally 
needs to be investigated why it was eventually decided in the wrong way. Following 
Kovacic83 and his process-based approach of an evaluation of competition policy, an 
efficiency or effectiveness analysis should be interpreted as a good starting point for more 
focused internal projects which aim at improving important in-house processes. Such a 
process evaluation “... might seek to assess the quality of the competition agency’s internal 
operations—the mix of managerial methods and organizational choices that determine how 
the agency allocates and applies its resources. This approach treats management and 
organization as critical inputs into the implementation of competition policy and seeks to 
identify improvements in how the competition agency operates. The logic is that progress 
toward superior managerial and organizational techniques will increase the likelihood that the 
agency’s substantive outputs generally promote the realization of the competition law’s 
objectives.”84  
  
C. CONCLUSION 
In the year 2005, a OECD Policy Roundtable exchanged views on the topic ‘Evaluation of the 
Actions and Resources of Competition Authorities’ and concluded that “[c]onsiderable work 
remains to be done to refine the methodologies used to evaluate the effectiveness of 
completed competition policy interventions.”85 Although only a couple of years have passed 
by since the Roundtable took place, the importance of an evaluation of competition policy has 
increased significantly, both in practice as well as in academia.  
 Against this background, the paper aimed at developing a methodology for an evaluation 
of competition policy. Based on the existing literature and experiences with policy evaluations 
in other areas of economic activity, the three-step / nine-building-blocks methodology 
provides guidance for evaluation projects and also assists in the identification of avenues for 
further academic research.     
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